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Privacy and the Other Miss M
DOROTHY GLANCY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two women, separated by a century in time, occupy center stage
in this reflection on the famous 1890 law review article, The Right
To Privacy, by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis.' The two women
never met each other. Nor were either of them, apparently, acquainted
with Warren and Brandeis. 2 They are not relatives in any conventional
sense of kinship, but they are surely sisters in a different way. They
are of special interest to lawyers because both women were famous
comic actresses and singers who went to court to vindicate their
celebrated identities. This article connects their stories as two public
people who have embodied one aspect of Warren and Brandeis' idea
of the right to privacy. Their names are Bette Midler and Marion
Manola. Bette Midler is widely acclaimed as "The Divine Miss M."
A century earlier, Marion Manola was also a famous Miss M who,
in her own way, was also divine.
Although there are many differences between the two women,
their stories contain certain similarities worth considering in connection with Warren and Brandeis' famous 1890 law review article.
Although neither secured legal protection for what she called her
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University, Santa Clara, Calif. B.A.,

Wellesley College, 1967; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1970.
1. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193 (1890). I
have discussed at some length the larger historical context of the Warren and Brandeis
article. See, Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIz. L. REv. 1
(1979); see also J.T. McCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY ch. 1

(1989).

2. It is possible that Warren and Brandeis had seen, or even met Marion
Manola, who was the featured singer for the opening "Pops" concert at the Music
Hall in Boston during the middle of October 1890. Newspaper accounts describe this
October 19, 1890, concert as presenting the full Germania Orchestra and the Harvard
male quartet, as well as Miss Manola. Warren and Brandeis, who were probably
writing their article at the time, may have been in the audience. According to
newspaper accounts, Marion Manola had been in Boston several times during the
autumn of 1890 to see John Mason, an actor at the Museum Theater, whom she
married a few months later. Clipping Files regarding "Marion Manola" in the New
York Public Library of the Performing Arts [hereinafter Clipping Files].
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"right to privacy," the two women's stories illuminate an often
overlooked aspect of the Warren and Brandeis argument for recognition of a legal right to privacy. That aspect concerns the property
rights of performing artists to control the uses of their personalities
in advertising.
This proprietary side of the right to privacy is sometimes thought
have
little to do with Warren and Brandeis' original idea and
to
argument. Now frequently called by a different name-"right of
publicity" 3 -this property right started out as an integral part of the
original argument for recognition of the right to privacy. After a
century, the original proprietary side of the right to privacy seems to
have faded into the background. My project here will be to bring
forward for reflection what time has clouded. First, let me introduce
each "Divine Miss M" and the story of her interaction with the right
to privacy. The implications of the stories of these two women for
the meaning of the right to privacy, both as Warren and Brandeis
originally conceived it, and as modern courts now enforce it, should
then come more clearly into view.

II.

4
MARION MANOLA V. STEVENS & MYERS

The world of comic opera and the glittering triviality of the
musical theater along New York's Broadway in the gay nineties seem
a lot closer to the world of the Divine Miss M than they do to the
world of law reviews and legal scholars. It may therefore come as a
surprise that the Warren and Brandeis article included as an example
of the right to privacy a lawsuit brought by a famous prima donna
from the comic opera. The law review article opened with three pages
of fairly general discussion of progress and the rights of man., Then,
3. See infra, text accompanying notes 167-171.
4. Manola Gets An Injunction, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1890, at 2, col. 2 (order
granting injunction); Miss Manola Seeks An Injunction, N.Y. Times, June 21, 1890,
at 2, col. 2 (N.Y.S. Ct. June 17, 1890).
5. The Warren and Brandeis article contains its share of sexual stereotypes.
For example, in discussing human emotions, the article seems to focus only on men:
"His reputation, the standing among his fellow-men, was considered, and the law of
slander and libel arose. Man's family relations became a part of the legal conception
of his life, and the alienation of a wife's affections was held remediable." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1, at 194 (footnotes omitted). One can, of course, read the
article's emphasis on the rights of man as referring to what we would now call
"human kind" or "humanity." Perhaps the article's early reference to Marion
Manola was a way of underscoring that more inclusive meaning. In any event, the
general issues regarding whether Warren and Brandeis were sexists, and their article
a reflection of Victorian gender chauvinism, must be left for another day.
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Marion Manola as "Bul-Bul"
1890
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from out of this abstract background, stepped the first specific
example of a living, breathing person who had vindicated the right to
privacy. That individual was a woman. Her name was Miss Marion
Manola.
Warren and Brandeis took some pains to describe "[t]he alleged
facts of a somewhat notorious case brought before an inferior tribunal

in New York a few months ago

.... "6 This

is the way Warren and

Brandeis referred to the New York Times. It is not consistent with
references to the New York Times elsewhere in the article. Citing to
newspaper accounts in the New York Times, Warren and Brandeis
described in a footnote the intriguing facts of the case:
[T~he complainant alleged that while she was playing in the
Broadway Theatre, in a role which required her appearance in
tights, she was, by means of a flash light, photographed
surreptitiously and without her consent, from one of the boxes
by defendant Stevens, the manager of the "Castle in the Air"
company, and defendant Myers, a photographer, and prayed
that the defendants might be restrained from making use of
the photograph taken. A preliminary injunction issued ex
parte, and a time was set for argument of the motion that the
injunction should be made permanent, but no one then appeared in opposition. 7
Warren and Brandeis described Marion Manola's case as involving
"consideration of the right of circulating portraits." 8 They then posed
the central question which their article was intended to address:
"[Wjhether our law will recognize and protect the right to privacy in
this and in other respects . . . ."9 They described this issue as one
which "must soon come before our courts for consideration."' ' 0
Recognition of the right to privacy in this respect involved enforcement of a proprietary right to a person's identity. Recognition of the
right to privacy in other respects would involve the authors' far more
innovative and controversial suggestions regarding legal vindication
of emotional aspects of the right to privacy through actions for
injuries to feelings, even in the absence of interference with property
rights. Although the article described Marion Manola's case as an
example of the former, proprietary aspect of the right to privacy, one
6. Id.at
7. Id. at
8. Id. at
9. Id.at
10. Id.

195.
195 n.7.
195-96.
196.
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of the interesting features of the Warren and Brandeis argument for
recognition of the right to privacy was the way their argument artfully
joined together both proprietary and emotional aspects of the right
to privacy. Such a linkage was certainly the implication of Marion
Manola's case.
Who was this Marion Manola? Why did Warren and Brandeis
bother to write about her in a law review article urging recognition
of the right to privacy? One apparent reason was to emphasize that
famous people, even notorious people, and certainly women, should
be entitled to legal protection for their privacy rights. Marion Manola's case makes the point, right up front, that the right to privacy
was intended to include the right of even a comic opera prima donna
on the public stage to prevent the use of her identity without her
consent. This aspect of Warren and Brandeis' original notion of the
right of privacy becomes much clearer when Marion Manola's lawsuit
is set against the background of her own life and times.
Marion Manola led a fast and fascinating life. She was one of
the most renowned leading ladies of the American musical stage
during the late 1880s and 1890s. Born in 1865 in Oswego, New York,
she was raised in Cleveland, Ohio, where she was known as Mina
Stevens. She sang in the church choir and in amateur theatricals where
she met and married a young man from Cleveland society, Henry
Mould. Married at the age of seventeen, she soon had a daughter,
Adelaide. After Mr. Mould's business experienced financial difficulty,
Mr. and Mrs. Mould disappeared to Europe. Mina Stevens Mould
studied to be a grand opera singer in Paris under the tutelage of
Madame Marchesi. But, when the family finances became strained,
she turned her talent to light opera and made her stage debut in Bath,
England, in the operetta, "Falka.""1 She appears to have taken as
her stage name the title of a French opera, "Manola. '1 2
When Warren and Brandeis wrote about her in 1890, Marion
Manola was at the height of her stardom. Not a conventionally pretty

11. Our Gallery of Players. XIII. Marion Manola, THE ILLUSTRATED AMERICAN,
Sept. 26, 1891, at 270, col. 1.
12. The plot of the operetta, "Manola," was derived from the French opera,
"Le Jour et la Nuit," and involved a man who had one wife by day and another
wife by night. G. BORDMAN, AMAERCAN MusIcAL THEATER 64 (1986). What it had to
do with the woman formerly known as Mrs. Henry Mould is lost in the mists of
time. Mr. Henry Mould also took to the musical comedy stage, using the stage name
of Carl Irving. Having returned to New York, Carl Irving left the stage in 1888 to
go back to being Henry Mould in the iron and steel business. Our Gallery of Players.
XIII. Marion Manola, supra note 11, at 270, col. 2.
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woman, Marion Manola appears in photographs taken in the 1890s
to be rather plain.' 3 She was neither a glamorous, voluptuous woman,
such as her contemporary, Lillian Russell, nor a cute, winsome
ingenue, such as her costar Della Fox. An article from 1888 described
her simply as a "young singer.' 1 4 In 1890 the New York Times
described her as "the little singer and actress."" She was depicted as
"very small" with "fine dark eyes, and a wealth of auburn hair that
glistens like burnished copper."'1

6

She had a lively, riveting personality

which caused the Dramatic Mirror to rhapsodize, "There is in her
face a something more than prettiness, and her slender figure is a
graceful relief to the eyes after the numerous over-plump beauties. "7
She left the stage in the late 1890s, her health ruined by addiction to
morphine. After the turn of the century, remarried and free of
morphine, she returned to the stage as one of the first actresses from
the legitimate theater to appear in vaudeville.' 8 When she died in
1914, her obituary described her as "a famous light opera star of
twenty years ago ....

1.

2.

13.
14.
15.
16.

19

See XV G. ODell, Annals of the New York Stage 340 (1949).
She Doesn't Want the Dog, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1888, at 5, col. 4.
Manola and Cottrelly, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1890, at 8, col. 2.
Our Gallery of Players. XIII. Marion Manola, supra note 11, at 270, col.

17. Dramatic Mirror, June 29, 1889, at 14, col. 1, Clipping Files, supra note

18. Death of Marion Manola, Dramatic Mirror, Oct. 14, 1914, Clipping Files,
supra note 2.
19. Marion Manola Dead, N. Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1914, at 11, col. 5. After
Warren and Brandeis wrote about her, Marion Manola's life continued to be entangled
with the law. Following her widely-reported 1890 divorce in Boston from her first
husband, Henry Mould, she married again in 1891. Her second husband was a
Boston actor known as "Handsome Jack" Mason. In 1894 the Masons got into a
dispute over compensation with the management of the Tremont Theater in Boston.
The New York Times recounts the embarrassing situation of Marion Manola being
removed from the stage after the theater management brought in another prima
donna who was also on stage playing the leading role in "Patience." Manola Removed
from the Stage, N.Y. Times, June 6, 1894, at 1, col. 4. When Marion Manola
divorced Mason in 1900, among the grounds for her complaint was her claim that
her husband had addicted her to morphine. Having been granted the divorce, as well
as alimony, the newspapers reported that when she brought legal action to force
Mason to pay the alimony, Jack Mason had his current girlfriend write the alimony
checks to his former wife as an insult. Nevertheless, after Marion Manola married
again in 1904, she chose to live across the street from Jack Mason in New Rochelle.
Legal melodrama even touched Marion Manola's death. Marion Manola's third
husband was an accountant, George Gates, who was the auditor of one of the early
motion picture companies. In the fall of 1914, her husband had been named in a
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The comic opera stage which Marion Manola graced in 1890
was a very lively place. Musical theater in the United States was
still in its formative years. During the late 1870s and 1880s, Gilbert
and Sullivan operettas, such as "H.M.S. Pinafore," transformed
the musical theater as it moved away from grand opera and began
to offer a mixture of operetta, French opera bouffe, comic opera,
and musical reviews and extravaganzas, which themselves derived
in part from minstrel shows. 20 In his history, American Musical
Theater, Bordman explains:
Theatrical royalty and its friends found refuge in comic
opera, clothed in that genre's universally higher musical
pretensions. The higher social order of its characters and its
loftier musical aims were the genre's unifying traits. As often
as not the form was not even accorded the courtesy of a
generally accepted name. One playgoer's comic opera was
another's opera bouffe and a third's operetta. 2'
In the next century this musical theater would evolve further into
vaudeville and the modern musical comedy. 22
Marion Manola gained fame as a comic opera prima donna 3
singing with the McCaull Opera Company. 24 Her somewhat stormy
criminal libel arrest warrant, because he had signed an affidavit that the Vice President
and General Manager of the Colonial Motion Picture Corporation had asked him to
falsify the books and to make false statements to stockholders. Detectives attempting
to serve the arrest warrant had difficulty finding Mr. Gates, so they searched Mrs.
Gates' (Marion Manola's) sick room as they hunted for him. The next day, her
nerves once again shattered, Marion Manola died at the age of 48 in the course of a
gall bladder operation. Stageland Gossip, Cincinnati Inquirer, Oct. 7, 1914, Clipping
Files, supra note 2; FormerActress Dead, Baltimore American, Oct. 7, 1914, Clipping
Files, supra note 2.
20. See G. BoRDmAN, supra note 12, at 1-119.
21. G. BoRDmAN, supra note 12, at 118.
22. According to Marion Manola's obituary in the Dramatic Mirror, Marion
Manola "was one of the first legitimate actresses to go into vaudeville." Death of
Marion Manola, supra note 18. Later in the twentieth century, some of Bette Midler's
elaborate shows and tours, such as "De Tour" and "Clams on the Halfshell Review"
have been happy throwbacks to this very heterogenous genre of musical entertainment.
23. Leading ladies of the comic opera were frequently referred to as operatic
prima donnas. They were famous for behaving much as one connotation of "prima
donna," referring to a tendency to temperamental overreaction, suggests. Many
comic opera prima donnas were more sought after for their physical beauty and
entertainment abilities, than for the quality of their voices. Marion Manola was
unusual among the American prima donnas of her era, because she was formally
trained in grand opera in Europe. In a book written about comic opera prima donnas
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relationship with that company both made her famous and set the
stage for the events described by Warren and Brandeis. In the spring
of 1889, one year before the incident described in the law review
article, the New York Times carried a story under the headline,
"Marion Manola Pouting: A Speck of War in the M'Caull Opera
Company. ' 25 The article described her as so insulted because one
of her fellow actors pushed her on stage, that she refused to appear
on stage with the offending actor until he apologized for the public
insult. This incident exemplified the temperamental personality for
which Marion Manola was widely known. 26 The 1889 newspaper
article also described her public role as a stage performer as properly
set apart from her private life. The article offered the opinion that
Marion Manola should not have refused to perform: "A lady
holding her position has no right to allow her personal grievances
to influence her to the detriment of her manager's interests. Her
proper course, . . . was to fulfill her engagement to her manager
' 27
and the public, and settle her private grievances in private." The
article also reported the unyielding views of the manager, Benjamin
published ten years after the events described by Warren and Brandeis, Lewis Strang
described these women, as for the most part, "without the requisite training, either
in the art of singing or in the art of impersonation, that would entitle them to be
seriously considered as great vocalists or as great actors. They are, however, past
mistresses in the one essential for their profession,-the art of entertaining." See L.
SmANo, FAMous PRIMA DONNAS iX-X (1900). Strang notes that their careers are

characterized by "almost universal brevity," with ten years usually limiting their
professional lives. The prima donna's fame, Strang suggests, is based on "personal
magnetism and physical beauty;" she is a "player of personality," as "[sihe acts
herself under every circumstance." Id. at x, xii, xiii.
24. The McCaull Opera Company traveled all over the United States, from
New York to Boston, to Washington, D.C., to Chicago, and even out to San
Francisco. The impresario, Col. John A. McCaull, had been a Confederate officer
and a Baltimore lawyer. During the 1880s McCaull became known as "the father of
comic opera in America." G. BoRDmAN, supra note 12, at 54. Manola appears
consistently to have referred to her employer as "Colonel McCaull." See Manola
and Cottrelly, supra note 15, at 8, col. 2.
25. Marion Manola Pouting, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1889, at 3, col. 2.
26. An undated handwritten letter from Mary E. Remington, Dramatic Editor
of the Grand Rapids Herald contained in the clipping files of the New York Public
Library of the Performing Arts, described Marion Manola as "a woman singularly
gifted with rare and wonderful talents, but equally cursed with a vibrant impulsive
temperament which has been an irresistible consuming force through the power of
its own intensity." Clipping Files, supra note 2.
27. Marion Manola Pouting, supra note 25. Warren and Brandeis were later
to suggest, using Marion Manola as an example, that there were privacy interests,
particularly those of a proprietary nature, involved even in public activities of public
people.
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Stevens, that, "[w]hen Miss Manola deliberately absented herself
from the theatre he had no alternative but to ignore her until she
returned to her duty." '2 8 This same manager, Stevens, was the main
defendant in the injunctive action recounted by Warren and Brandeis the next year.
Between this incident in June of 1889 and the photographic
altercation a year later, Marion Manola was involved in yet another
controversy with the McCaull Opera Company. A series of newspaper
articles recounted at length Marion Manola's efforts to quit the
McCaull Company early in 1890, before her contract was scheduled
to end in May. She had already agreed to join the new De Wolf
Hopper Opera Bouffe Company later in the spring. 29 Moving to the
De Wolf Hopper Company was, Marion Manola told the New York
Times, "a step much to my advantage in every way-a course which
I was bound to pursue.''30 Claiming ill health, she left the McCaull
Company in Chicago and returned to New York."' McCaull granted
her two week's vacation and served on her "a legal notice . . .that
she would be held responsible for damages if she did not return to
the company at the expiration of that time."3 a2 The same article
reported that, "[t]he threat of a law suit for damages does not seem
to trouble the little singer and actress at all." 33
Within weeks, a New York court had granted Col. McCaull an
injunction against Marion Manola to restrain her from singing with
another opera company during the spring of 1890.14 Manola, who
was at the time living as a single mother, pleaded concern about her
"little daughter, Adelaide," a beautiful nine-year-old child." The
28. Id.

29. This was the company which would launch, as its first production, "Castles
in the Air," out of which arose the lawsuit Warren and Brandeis described. See
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195 n.7.
30. Manola and Cottrelly, supra note 15.
31. On New Years eve, while the McCaull Opera Company was in Chicago,
Marion Manola and another of the company's leading ladies, Mathilde Cottrelly,
apparently clashed. Marion Manola had announced that she was ill and would have
to leave the company for the rest of the season. Mme. Cottrelly accused Miss Manola
of conspiring to break up the company. The New York Times quotes at length from
Marion Manola's own description of "the explosion, and it was a terrible one, I can
tell you." The newspaper article only barely alludes to the reason for Cottrelly's
charges: Marion Manola was in fact about to leave the McCaull Opera Company,
along with the company manager and another of its stars, De Wolf Hopper. Manola
and Cottrelly, supra note 15.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Against Marion Manola, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1890, at 8, col. 5.
35. Manola and Cottrelly, supra note 15. Marion Manola was, in fact, still
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judge found that Manola's claim that "the support of herself and her
child would be endangered by the injunction" was without foundation, as the "plaintiff [McCaull] is willing and anxious for her to
complete her engagement at $150 per week, and it will be her own
fault if she finds herself without support." 3 6 This incident gave Marion
Manola some experience with the power and process of the courts.
Later, when she brought the suit described by Warren and Brandeis,
3 7
she knew just the lawyer to hire, the same A. H. Hummel who had
secured the injunction against her for Col. McCaull.
The injunctive action Warren and Brandeis described occurred
five months later, a few weeks after the opening of the De Wolf
Hopper Company's first production, "Castles in the Air." 38 The
uninspired libretto by C.A. Byrne revolved around the perils of a
young man, Bul-Bul (the part played by Marion Manola), who was
both deeply in debt and deeply in love with Blanche. Cabolastro was
both the potential source of a disguise which would allow Bul-Bul to
escape his creditors and Blanche's father. Cabolastro agreed to provide
the disguise if Bul-Bul could out-talk Cabolastro's garrulous wife.
Bul-Bul's success, both in the war of words and in wooing Blanche,
was rewarded by his prospective father-in-law's paying off the young
married to Henry Mould. She divorced Mould later in 1890 in order to marry Jack
Mason. Her daughter Adelaide later married the novelist and playwright Rupert
Hughes. Marion Manola Dead, supra note 19.
36. Against Marion Manola, N.Y. Times, Feb. 11, 1890, at 8, col. 5.
37. Hummell also represented Marion Manola in her divorce action against
John Mason, a decade later. Sues Jack Mason, article dated Feb. 26, 1900, Clipping
Files supra note 2.
38. Very little that is complimentary seems to have been written about this
American operetta, which was, according to Strang "not a great success in New
York, but it did very well on the road." See L. STRANG, FAMous STARS OF LIGHT
OPERA 87 (1900). The "Castles In The Air" title alludes to Thoreau's famous advice
in Walden:
[I]f one advances confidently in the direction of his dreams, and endeavors
to live the life which he has imagined, he will meet with a success unexpected
in common hours .... If you have built castles in the air, your work need
not be lost; that is where they should be. Now put the foundations under
them.

H.

THOREAU, WALDEN

215 (1854) But the operetta's plot had nothing to do with

Thoreau. It was borrowed from Offenbach's Les Bravards, and allegedly derived
from Cervante's intermezzo, Les Dos Habliadores.The music was by Gustave Kerker,
a popular New York conductor and composer of the time. G. BORDMAN, supra note
12, at 103. Describing the dialogue as "drivelling nonsense," one reviewer commented
that "The libretto is simply idiotic." The Spirit of the Times, May 10, 1890, in the
file regarding "Castles in the Air" in the New York Public Library for the Performing
Arts.
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man's debts.3 9 However, the plot of the comic opera was not why
audiences came to see the De Wolf Hopper Company's new production. They came to see and hear the stars. The role played by the
company's leading male star, De Wolf Hopper, was not even related
to the plot. Hopper drifted on and off the stage throughout the
evening as a freethinking judge, Filacoudre, who pantomimed, clowned,
4°
sang, and otherwise "stole the thunder from all other performers.''
Such was the rather zany context out of which Marion Manola's
lawsuit arose. It was a lawsuit in which privacy interests confronted
the development of advertising and the invention of photography.
The particular object of Marion Manola's legal complaint was
not the comedic chaos of the De Wolf Hopper Opera Company's
production, but what appears to have been an advertising stunt staged
by the manager, Stevens, to bolster faltering attendance at the show.
This theater manager was the same Benjamin Stevens, with whom
Marion Manola had tangled in court before. 41 The initial report of
the photography incident in the New York Times was headlined,
"Photographed in Tights: Marion Manola Caught on the Stage by a

Camera.'

'42

The story noted:

A photographer was placed in one of the boxes, and when an
opportunity occurred during the performance a flash light was
used and a photograph of the actress was secured .... The
photographer made no attempt to conceal his presence in the
box, but on the contrary, seemed to do all he could to attract
the attention of the audience. In this he succeeded fully.4 3
The article ended with a revealing question: "Who will say that the
average theatre manager does not know how to advertise his com39. See G. BoRDmAN, supra note 12, at 103.
40. D. EWEN, COMPLETE BOOK OF THE AMERICAN MusicAL THEATER 176 (1959).
De Wolf Hopper was famous for his towering height and booming bass voice. In his
history of the American musical theater, Bordman recounts that during an 1888
revival of "Prince Methusalem," a Johann Strauss operetta, "somewhere in the
second act, De Wolf Hopper departed from the text and inserted a poem, 'Casey at
the Bat,' by Ernest Lawrence Thayer. Just how Hopper justified the insertion of this
bit of baseball lore into an operetta will probably never be known. But his reading
drew insistent encores, and for the rest of his career there was hardly a performance
in which Hopper was not called on to recite the piece. The interpolation vividly
illustrates the freewheeling attitudes of late 19th-century authors and performers .... ." G. BORDMAN, supra note 12, at 95.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 25-28 (regarding the extensively reported
pouting episode).
42. Photographedin Tights, N.Y. Times, June 15, 1890, at 2, col. 3.
43. Id.
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pany?"" Three days later, the newspaper referred to Marion Manola's
"extensively advertized story," ' 45 when it reported that she had secured
an injunction. On June 21, 1890 the New York Times noted that,
"Marion Manola's tights will probably not figure hereafter in comic
opera advertisements. '" 46
The 1890s were, after all, what Henry James called "the age of
advertising." ' 47 It was a time when Phineas T. Barnum, "the first
great advertising genius and the greatest publicity exploiter the world
has ever known," 48 enthralled the American public. Barnum's autobiography, Struggles and Triumphs, "sold more copies in the nineteenth century than any book except the Holy Bible." ' 49 According to
Barnum, the aim of advertising was "to extort attention." 50 He
proclaimed a grandiose role for advertising as itself a kind of show
business." When the theater manager, Stevens, staged his ostentatious
event at the expense of Marion Manola, he was simply acting as a
promoting his theatrical produclate nineteenth century entrepreneur
2
tion by flamboyant advertising.
The 1890s were also a time when photography had just become
more convenient and widely available. Photographers, such as Jacob
Riis and Alfred Steiglitz, were beginning to take candid photographs
around New York with improved photographic equipment. 3 Daniel
Boorstin has described the social significance of these late nineteenth
44. Id.
45. Manola Gets an Injunction, supra note 4.
46. Miss Manola Seeks an Injunction, supra note 4.
47. J. WICKE, ADVERTISING FICTIONS 88 (1988).

48. F. PREsBREY, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF ADVERTISING 211(1929).
49. J. WICKE, supra note 47, at 55.
50. P. BARNUM, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 58 (1886).
51. Barnum explained,
The show business has all phases and grades of dignity, from the exhibition
of a monkey to the exposition of that highest art in music or the drama,
which entrances empires and secures for the gifted artist a world-wide fame
which princes well might envy.
Id. at 57.
52. The account of the incident in The Illustrated American reinforces the
conclusion that advertising was the real motivation of the manager, Stevens: "[H]e
had gained his object. He had attracted the attention of the public, and had obtained
any amount of free advertising for his opera. That was all he wanted." Our Gallery
of Players. XIII. Marion Manola, supra note 11, at 270, col. 2.
53. See generally H. GERNSHEIM & A. GERNSHEIM, THE HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY 410-22 (1969); J. LEMAGNY & A. ROUILLE, A HISTORY OF PHOTOGRAPHY:
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES (J. Lloyd, trans. 1986); P. HALES, SILER CITIES:
THE PHOTOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN URBANIZATION

(1984).
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century technological developments in photography as enormous,
because they made experience repeatable in unanticipated ways:
The decisive innovation was photography ... as a transformer of experience .... Such repeatable experience as was

possible in Old World cultures had been mainly through the
aristocratic arts of literature, painting, sculpture, and music,
or through the popular but limited arts of minstrelsy, folklore,
folk art, and folk music....
Photography took the first giant step toward democratizing
4
the repeatable experience .

Of course, the photographic equipment available in the 1890s was
quite different from that available today. Neither press reports nor
Warren and Brandeis described the type of camera used to take
Marion Manola's photograph. It may have been one of the larger
wooden box devices. But surreptitious photography was, at that time,
primarily associated with George Eastman's new Kodak. In 1888,
Eastman had put his new Kodak camera on the market, advertised as
"the smallest, lightest and simplest of all Detective Cameras ...
Makes 100 Exposures. Weight 35 oz."" This new camera was, according to its advertisements, designed for taking surreptitious photographs of unwitting, and often unwilling, people. The other important
photographic advance in the late 1880s was the development of
magnesium flash powder which vastly improved the quality and
convenience of indoor photography. The flash light used to secure
the photograph of Marion Manola on stage would have been provided
by the ignition of "smokeless" magnesium powder. Unfortunately,
"[s]moke formation remained a great drawback, and so-called
'smokeless' flash powders were only smokeless until lit. ' '56 The magnesium flash and accompanying smoke would undoubtedly have
created considerable commotion in the theater.
Apparently, Marion Manola did not want to have her appearance
on the stage in "Castles in the Air" repeated by means of a candid
photograph. She also, undoubtedly, did not appreciate having her
performance interrupted and upstaged by a theater manager's advertising gimmick. According to the New York Times, "[w]hen Miss
Manola realized what had been done she threw her mantle over her
54. D. BooasnN, THE Am~mcANs: Ti DEMOCRATIc EXPERENcE 371 (1973).
Boorstin devotes all of chapter 42 of his social history of the Americans to "Making

Experience Repeatable."

55. Id. at 374.
56. H. GERNSHEIM & A. GERNsHEmM, supra, note 53, at 428.
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face and ran off the stage. She returned, however, to finish her
performance."" Her next move was to go to court to obtain an
injunction against use of the surreptitiously taken flash-light photograph. By the end of the week, she had secured "an injunction against
the display of photographs of the actress in this style of stage
costume."5 8 The fact that no one appeared in opposition is a further
indication that the real reason for taking the photograph was the
manager's desire not so much for photographs as for the publicity
which the stunt successfully generated. Marion Manola brought suit
to enjoin use of the photograph because she did not choose to have
her image used for advertising purposes in that form.
Marion Manola had many reasons for objecting to the use of the
photograph. First, she was a trained singer who had studied grand
opera. Her voice and her acting ability constituted her professional
identity, not her legs. Moreover, Marion Manola may have been
uncomfortable in this particular trouser role, or in trouser roles in
general.5 9 It is also possible that the twenty-four year old single mother
6
experienced gender anxiety in the role of the young man, Bul-Bul. 0
Most of all, she was apparently concerned about here image in the
eyes of her nine-year-old daughter.
According to the first of the New York Times articles, "[i]t is
alleged that Miss Manola refused to be photographed in tights owing
to her modesty."16' However, modesty does not quite capture the
reason Marion Manola gave for refusing to allow her image in tights
to be used in advertising the comic opera. The IllustratedAmerican
offered a more detailed explanation:
Miss Manola had a daughter-Adelaide-a beautiful child
of nine, who was being educated at the Convent of Mount St.
57. Photographed in Tights, supra note 42.
58. Miss Manola Seeks an Injunction, supra note 4.
59. It was not then, just as it is not now, particularly unusual for women
performers, in grand or light opera, to perform male parts. These parts are still
termed "trouser roles," despite the fact that the roles seem to involve the womenplaying-boys costumed in tights more often than in trousers. Another of the leading
ladies of the late nineteenth-century comic opera described "a fascination about boys'

parts .... It is something of a study to do them just right, to be feminine and still
One must never overstep the line of womanliness in seeking
not to be effiminate ....

masculinity, and she must still make the character a real boy and not a girl disguised
as a boy." L. STRANO, supra note 23, at 170-71 (quoting a conversation with Marie
Celeste).
60. One theater critic reviewing "Castles in the Air" noted that "Marion
Manola sang deliciously, but she lacked the swagger for her manish part." The Spirit
of the Times, supra, note 38.
61. Photographedin Tights, supra note 42.
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Vincent, near New York. She disliked the idea of her daughter
seeing a photograph of her mother dressed in tights for sale
in the shops of Broadway, and when the proposition was made
to her by the manager of the company, she positively refused
to be photographed.
The manager saw a chance for advertising the opera, and
at once seized it. The next day all the newspapers contained
the story, and for some days afterward women wrote to the
journals supporting Miss Manola in her refusal, and expressing
admiration for her modesty. 62
Marion Manola had not been shy about exposing her legs to public
view. She did not object to performing in tights on stage. She even
6
posed for a series of charming studio portraits in such costume.
There was nothing unusual about a prima donna appearing on
the comic operatic stage in tights in 1890." Writing about the American musical theater of the early 1890s, Bordman notes, "acrobatic
clowns and prima donnas dominated the musical stage of the period.
The clowns were almost always in grotesque make-up and the prima
donnas as often as not in tights, both thereby underscoring the

2.

62. Our Gallery of Players. XIII. Marion Manola, supra note 11 at 270, col.

63. One of the several photographs made of Marion Manola in the role of BulBul accompanies this article at page 403. The photo files on "Marion Manola" in
the New York Public Library of the Performing Arts contain a number of different
studio poses of her as Bul-Bul. In some of them she is shown full length in tights.
Others simply show her head and shoulders. An August 12, 1890, article in the New
York Times remarks that the one hundredth performance of the operetta was
celebrated by presenting the audience with souvenir pictures of the members of the
"Castles in the Air" cast, including Marion Manola. Since no mention is made of
tights, it must have been the head and shoulders pose. Given the earlier injunction
and attendant publicity, if Marion Manola had been shown in tights, the New York
Times would almost certainly have noted it. The same article also reports that Marion
Manola had left the cast for two days vacation on August 1, and, because she had
not returned, had been discharged from the cast for violation of contract. Manola Is
No Longer Bul-Bul, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1890, at 4, col. 5. Apparently she had
gone to Boston to go sailing with Jack Mason on his yacht.
64. Legend has it that tights were invented early in the nineteenth century by
a French costumier called Maillot. Until the mid-1870s, stage costumes for ballet
tended to hover around the knees. Then Italian ballerinas raised their skirts several
inches above their knees and the rest of the dance world began to follow. This stage
fashion quickly made its way into the music halls and music theaters. R. STRONG, I.
GUEST, R. BUCKLE, B. KAY & Liz DA COSTA, DESIGNING FOR THE DANCER 56 (1981);

G.

BoRDMAN,

supra, note 12, at 25-26.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 10

traditions out of which they came. ' 65 What she objected to was the
use of her picture in tights to advertise the comic opera in which she
was appearing. She was determined to control the use of her image
and identity in ways that might interfere with her relationship with
her convent-educated daughter. Having said that she would not allow
such advertising use of her identity, she felt that she had a legal right
to enforce that refusal.6
Marion Manola's success in getting a court to enforce her right.
to control the exploitation of her personality obviously intrigued
Warren and Brandeis. Their description of her "somewhat notorious
case ' 67 is curious in a number of ways. To begin with, what Marion
Manola succeeded in protecting was not very private. She was, after
all, a performer singing and acting on the New York stage, where
anyone who bought a ticket could come and see her. In addition,
Warren and Brandeis did not have much of a case report about which
to write. Marion Manola's lawsuit ended with an ex parte default
ruling by an "inferior tribunal. ' 6 No official report of the decision
appears in any published report of judicial decisions. 69 Moreover,
Warren and Brandeis described Marion Manola's story with a liveliness unusual for a late nineteenth-century law review article. It seems
that Marion Manola's story was one they simply could not resist
telling.
For lawyers of this century, Marion Manola's story is of primary
interest as an example of legal doctrine. The legal doctrine her case
illustrates is a frequently overlooked part of Warren and Brandeis'
argument for recognition of the right to privacy. The article's more
65. G. BORDMAN, supra, note 12, at 119. More than twenty years before Marion
Manola appeared on stage in tights, Lydia Thompson's famous blond burlesques had
entertained audiences in New York. In 1868 Miss Thompson had brought to New
York from London, "a troupe of beautiful blond girls, often dressed seductively in
tights," who "clowned and crooned in English." These "girls also happily assumed
the trouser roles that exploited their shapely limbs." Id. If one peruses photographs
and sketches of late nineteenth century stage costumes, for example in the work of
Degas, women appearing on stage in tights appears to have been commonplace.
66. In this aspect of her story, Marion Manola's action was remarkably parallel
to that brought by Bette Midler almost a century later to enforce her refusal to lend
her vocal identity to the automobile commercial. See infra text accompanying notes
77-84.
67. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
68. Id.
69. Ironically, the only source available to Warren and Brandeis for citation
was a newspaper. Other parts of their article target newspapers for criticism as major
perpetrators of invasions of privacy.
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revolutionary suggestion that the right to privacy provides a legal
basis for vindicating feelings and providing redress for emotional
injuries has, over the past hundred years, overshadowed this proprietary aspect of the original concept of the right to privacy. The express
reason Warren and Brandeis gave for telling the Marion Manola story
was to provide an illustration of a judicial decision which "directly
involved the . . . right of circulating portraits." 70 In discussing this
aspect of the right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis presented it as
part of mainstream legal doctrine which protected intangible property
rights. But they argued that these intangible property rights should be
seen as part of a larger category of legal right, the right to privacy:
"[L]egal doctrines relating to infractions of what is ordinarily termed
the common-law right to intellectual and artistic property are, it is
believed, but instances and applications of a general right to privacy
....

971

The proprietary "principle which protects personal writings

and all other personal productions, not against theft and physical
appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not
the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personal72
ity."'
.At the beginning of the law review article, Warren and Brandeis
suggested a hierarchical relationship between privacy and property in
which intellectual property was presented as a subcategory of the
more general principle of the right to privacy. Later in the article,
when they sought to highlight the distinct nature of the more novel
emotional-injury aspect of the right to privacy, they sharply distinguished this emotional aspect of the right to privacy from the right
to property. When later discussing rights to prevent the use of
surreptitiously taken photographs, they described a close relationship
between property and privacy: "The right of property in its widest
sense, including all possession, including all rights and privileges, and
hence embracing the right to an inviolate personality, affords alone
that broad basis" for protecting an individual's right to prevent use
of photographs taken without that individual's consent. 73 They had
earlier outlined this right to prevent use of unconsented photographs,
in connection with Marion Manola's case, as an instance of the
proprietary aspect of the right to privacy.
70. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195-96.
71. Id. at 198.
72. Id. at 205.
73. Id. at 211. The connection indicated by the choice of the word "embracing"
need not mean a hierarchical relationship in which property subsumed privacy, or
vice versa.
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The symbiotic relationship between this proprietary aspect of the
right to privacy and the other emotional aspect of the right to privacy
was, for Warren and Brandeis, quite close indeed. An important
premise of their argument for protecting the right to privacy was the
notion that one owned one's self, one's ideas and one's self-image,
as a property right worthy of legal protection. They argued that the
personal right to psychological integrity similarly should be worthy of
legal protection against injuries to one's feelings and self-image. These
aspects were two sides, having different practical results, of the legal
recognition of the right to "inviolate personality. ' 74 One side of the
right to privacy had to do with proprietary rights. The other side had
to do with emotional integrity. These two aspects were encompassed
by a single general principle, the right to privacy. 75 Marion Manola's
case served as an illustration of Warren and Brandeis' premise that
the law of intellectual property already recognized and protected
certain proprietary aspects of this complex right to privacy. Most of
the rest of their article was devoted to arguing that the emotional or
psychological aspects of personality deserved direct legal protection
as well. To emphasize that their concept of the right to privacy
embraced the property rights of celebrated personalities to control the
uses of their identities in advertising, Warren and Brandeis pointed
out that a New York court had already determined that Marion
Manola had the right to prevent exploitation of her "inviolate personality. ' 76 Indeed, the comic opera prima donna's personality was
her most valuable asset.
74. Id. at 205. Warren and Brandeis explained:
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to

thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of
writing or of the arts, so far as it consists in preventing publication, is
merely an instance of the enforcement of the more general right of the

individual to be let alone.... In each of these rights, as indeed in all other

rights recognized by the law, there inheres the quality of being owned or
possessed-and (as that is the distinguishing attribute of property) there
may be some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But,
obviously, they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended

under that term. The principle which protects personal writings and all other

personal productions, not against theft and physical appropriation, but

against publication in any form, is in reality not the principle of private

property, but that of an inviolate personality.
Id. (footnote omitted).

75. Professor Paul Freund elaborated on this notion of a general principle of
a right to privacy in his essay, Freund, Privacy: One Concept or Many, in NoMos
XIII: PRIVACY 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).
76. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
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Warren and Brandeis were also interested in taking a deeper look
into the reasons why the law should protect such property rights in
an individual's identity. They suggested that the reason why the law
enforced Marion Manola's right to prevent the use of her image in
advertising without her consent was because such a right was an
attribute of her intrinsically valuable human personality. Although
Manola's case exemplified the proprietary side of the right to privacy,
contemporaries of Warren and Brandeis would have known that the
temperamental prima donna's legal action must have primarily reflected her notorious emotional side. After all, at the time Warren
and Brandeis wrote about her case, Marion Manola was as famous
for her sensitive temperament as she was for her brilliant soprano
voice.
III.

77
MEDLER v. FORD MOTOR CO.

A century later, another singer-actress-entertainer, Bette Midler,
was also outraged at the way her identity had been taken and used
without her consent. Like Marion Manola, Bette Midler went to
court. However, what Bette Midler sought to protect was the embodiment of her identity in the sound of her voice, rather than her visual
image. Midler's lawsuit targeted an advertising agency (Young &
Rubicam) and an automobile company (Ford Motor Company). Midler 6omplained that, after she had turned down Young & Rubicam's
request that she sing for a television commercial advertising Ford
Motor Company's Mercury Sable automobile, the advertisers hired
one of Bette Midler's former back-up singers, Ula Hedwig, to imitate
the sound of Midler's hit record of "Do You Want to Dance" for
78
the commercial.
The rights which Bette Midler sought to vindicate were very
particular. She did not claim to own the song "Do You Want to
Dance." ' 79 Nor did Midler contend that a recording of her own voice
appeared in the television commercial. 80 What Bette Midler did complain about was what the Ninth Circuit ultimately described as
"pirat[ing] her identity""' by the advertisement's use of what was
77. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
78. Id. at 461.
79. Bobby Freeman, who wrote the song and titled it "Do You Wanna Dance"
in 1958, holds the copyright, along with Clockus Music Company. Joint Brief of
Defendants-Appellees at 3-4, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(No. 87-6168) [hereinafter Appellees' Brief].
80. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
81. Id.
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intended to, and did in fact, sound exactly like the popular recording
of her voice to attract attention and to generate good feelings about
the automobile shown in the television commercial. Bette Midler was
also concerned that the advertisers had done this despite her express
refusal to agree to sing for the commercial. The Ninth Circuit agreed:
"At issue in this case is only the protection of Midler's voice. The
district court described the defendants' conduct as that 'of the average

thief.' They decided, 'If we can't buy it, we'll take

it.

' ''s2

In reversing the district court's summary judgment ruling for
defendants, the Ninth Circuit held that Bette Midler could recover
damages in tort based on a common law theory "that the defendants
here for their own profit in selling their product did appropriate part
of her identity. 83 The Ninth Circuit's opinion, written by Judge
Noonan, never described the appropriation of Bette Midler's identity
as a violation of her right to privacy. However, the theory of liability
which allowed Bette Midler to recover damages appears to be remarkably similar to that which Warren and Brandeis had described as the
theoretical basis for Marion Manola's injunction. "What is put
forward as protectible here is more personal than any work of
authorship," wrote the Ninth Circuit in 1988.8 Almost a hundred
years earlier, in 1890, Warren and Brandeis had explored a new theory
which would justify just such a protectable interest in connection with
that other celebrated Miss M, Marion Manola.
In understanding the theory of liability recognized by the Ninth
Circuit in Midler, it helps to know something about the plaintiff.
Bette Midler is the inventor of the Divine Miss M persona.85 Recently
awarded a Grammy for best record of the year,8 6 Bette Midler has
published two books,8 7 and has been the willing subject of numerous

82. Id. at 462. Ultimately, the Ford Motor Company was dismissed as a
defendant before the case went to the jury. This dismissal left the advertising agency,
Young & Rubicam, as the sole defendant. A second, post-trial appellate round, with
both an appeal by Midler and a cross-appeal by Young & Rubicam, is pending before
the Ninth Circuit. In this second appeal, Bette Midler has appealed the trial court's

refusal to send her claim for punitive damages to the jury. Young & Rubicam has
cross-appealed on an issue involving preemption by federal copyright law.

83. Id. at 463-64.
84. Id. at 462.

85. J. SPADA, THE DVINE BETTE MIDLER 45 (1984).
86. For "Wind Beneath My Wings." See N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1990, at B4
col. 3.

87. B.

MIDLER,

DIVNE (1983).

A ViEw FROM A

BROAD

(1980); B. MIDLER,

THE SAGA OF BABY
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interviews." She has hardly been shy about promoting herself.8 9 She
was born and raised in a family of modest means in Hawaii, was the
valedictorian of her high school class, and at present lives with her
husband and daughter in the hills above Hollywood. When she has a
new movie or record release, she willingly courts media attention.
Outside of her public life, however, she enjoys a certain quiet and
unrecognized anonymity. She sometimes enjoys pretending to be a
librarian, a career she might have chosen had she not become a singer
and movie actress.9
Feature articles about Bette Midler have typically mentioned her
diminutive stature and contrasted her physical smallness with the
larger-than-life, magnetic energy which rivets attention on her when
she performs. Like Marion Manola, Bette Midler has become famous,
not as a conventional beauty, but rather as an electric performer of
great charisma. Writing for the Rolling Stone in 1979, Timothy White
described having lunch with Bette Midler at the Algonquin Hotel in
New York: "[T]here is little outward indication of the great charisma
and convulsive energy she exhibits when she steps before the footlights. She is diminutive (five feet one) and deceptively frail looking." 9'
At the same time, her performances as "the world's top singer-dancercomedian-songwriter-actress-author-survivor-thriver-dynamodivinity" 92 have tended to be larger than life. Midler has joyfully
embraced fame and stardom and, at the same time, appears to take
pleasure in being able to move unrecognized through the everyday
world when she is not performing. So there she is, a complex, even a
bit contradictory, personality: an outrageous performer who enjoys
no-holds-barred, publicity-seeking raw exhibitionism, who is also a
private person of intelligence and sensibility. The public knows quite
a lot about the private life and personality of Bette Midler, who
willingly discusses with reporters her need "for the great love of an
audience," 93 just as a century earlier Marion Manola's fans had
followed in the newspapers Miss Manola's rather different story of
88. See, e.g., Janowitz, Adventures in Tinseltown, N.Y. Times, March 22,
1987, VI:32, col. 1.
89. For example, the advertising posters for her "Divine Madness" album
show Bette Midler's face superimposed over Mount Rushmore next to George
Washington's. Her countenance among the enormous rock sculptures of United States
presidents clearly presents a very public, as well as a very large, self-image. A
reproduction of this poster is found in SPADA, suR note 85, at 188.
90. Corliss, Bette Steals Hollywood, TIME, Mar. 2, 1987 at 70.
91. White, The Homecoming, 306 ROLLING STONE, Dec. 13, 1979 at 65.
92. Corliss, supra note 90, at 66.
93. White, supra note 91, at 63.
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multiple marriages and divorces, of a close relationship with her
daughter, and even of a recovery from drug-addiction.
Bette Midler's sense of her own unique individuality is legendary.
She has explained that she was named after Bette (pronounced as
"Betty") Davis, but has preferred to assert her own strong identity
as Bette (sounds like "bet") Midler, the Divine Miss M.9 In her 1983
children's book, The Saga of Baby Divine, Bette Midler described a
redheaded Baby Divine born wearing red high-heeled shoes and
already calling out, "MORE!" 95 When Baby Divine philosophized in
verse about what it meant to be a "minuscule human," she declared:
My Shoes! My Red Hair! They're my Trump cards! She
thought.
Then her Brain formed this Pithy Bon. Mot:
Cherish Forever What Makes You Unique
Cause You're Really a Yawn If it Goes.6
It is just such an insistence on the value of her unique identity which
appears to have motivated Midler's recent lawsuit. In her legal action
against the television commercial, the "trump card" she protected
was not her physical appearance, but the sound of her voice.
Unlike Marion Manola, Bette Midler appears to be considerably
less temperamental and thin-skinned than the comic opera prima
donna of the previous century. But Bette Midler, like Marion Manola
before her, has apparently been involved in her share of litigation. 97
For example, she was reportedly sued for $3 million for breach of
contract by her Harlettes. 9 One of the plaintiffs in that action was
the same Ula Hedwig who imitated Midler's voice in the Ford Motor
Company television commercial. According to an unauthorized biography, Bette Midler was even sued by the costume designer who
created the famous mermaid costume in which Midler appears on the
covers of her Divine Madness album and of her book, A View from
A Broad.99 Curiously, the only officially reported litigation involving
Midler, before her suit against the Ford Motor Company, was a
94. Id. at 65.

95. B. MIDLER, THE

SAGA

OF BABY DIVINE (1983).

96. Id. (emphasis in original).

97. M. BEGo, BETTE MIDLER OUTRAGEOUSLY DIVINE: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 132-33 (1987).

98. Id.at 132.
99. Id. at 133. The costume designer reportedly claimed that Midler had
insufficiently credited the work of the designer in creating the image of Bette Midler's
Delores De Lago character. Id.
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lawsuit brought, not by Midler, but by the copyright holder of
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy," which was one of the songs in her
popular 1973 act and album, "The Divine Miss M."'10
The "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" case provides an illuminating
contrast to Midler v. Ford Motor Company. The "Boogie Woogie
Bugle Boy" litigation concerned copyright infringement by a raunchy
musical review which had used the song with different words and a
different title. Bette Midler was not a litigant, although her rendition
of the song is discussed extensively by the court.10' She knew the
defendants, one of whom, Billy Cunningham, had helped give Midler
her start as a solo performer by playing piano for her first appearance
at the Continental Baths in New York. 02 The defendants admitted
that they had listened to Bette Midler's rendition of the song (which
itself was a fairly close imitation of the Andrews Sisters' 1940s
recording'03 ) in coming up with their own suggestive version. The
"Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy" case is interesting for several reasons.
First, Bette Midler did not bring suit against the defendants who were
using one of the songs associated with her, but not replicating the
sound of her voice to advertise consumer products. Second, the case
illustrates Midler's own frequent imitation of other singers' styles and
her use of materials which had been performed by other artists.'°4
This borrowing of material and imitation of vocal styles and
sounds is precisely the type of activity which was not the focus of
Bette Midler's legal action against Young & Rubicam and the Ford
Motor Company. The focus of her lawsuit was the defendants'
deliberate use of her identity as embodied in the recorded sound of
her voice, not only without her consent, but after she had expressly
turned down the advertisers' request for her to sing. When the
advertising agency called to ask her to sing for the commercial, they
seemingly recognized that there was commercial advertising value in
her identity as reflected in the distinctive sound of her voice. In suing
the advertisers, Midler was not trying to prevent other singers from
doing take-offs on her style of singing. She just did not want to have
her personality, as embodied in the distinctive sound of her voice,
used to sell automobiles. The Ninth Circuit held that she had such a
100. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 677 F.2d.
180 (2d Cir. 1981).
101. Id.at 449.
102. J. SPADA, supra note 85, at 20.
103. M. BEGO, supra note 97, at 62; J. SPADA, supra note 85, at 48.
104. Bette Midler's first major motion picture role was the title role in "The
Rose," in which Midler portrayed a singer who closely resembled Janis Joplin.
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right and that it was a property right. 05 The legal basis for her
recovery of damages was remarkably similar to the proprietary aspect
of the right to privacy which Warren and Brandeis, a century earlier,
had described as the right vindicated by Marion Manola. Listen closely
to the Midler opinion's choice of words in ruling that "a celebrated
chanteuse"'' 0 was entitled to legal protection for a right "more
personal than any work of authorship"' 0 7 from "exploitation without
her consent."'0 In the distant background, there is an unmistakable
echo of Warren and Brandeis' argument for the right of privacy. The
shadowy presence of Marion Manola almost comes into view. Of
course, neither Warren and Brandeis, nor the right to privacy, nor
Marion Manola is directly mentioned in the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
In her first appeal, Midler's briefs to the Ninth Circuit did present
a privacy claim, although no citation to Warren and Brandeis appears.109 Midler's second argument on appeal was: "Defendant's use
of a sound-alike to imitate Midler's voice in a television commercial
constitutes commercial appropriation under common law ...

rights

of privacy."" 0 Her opening brief explained that "appropriation of
personality under a pure privacy theory [involves] injury to feelings.""' In a later section, her brief urged:
Application of the right of privacy theory is particularly
appropriate here since Midler has a longstanding conviction
that she would not endorse commercial products of any kind.
Thus, the Defendants' deceptive imitation of her voice in their
Lincoln-Mercury commercial caused her emotional injury as
well as the injury to her proprietary interests." 2

Midler's privacy claim appears in a separate section of the brief just
after another claim based on "common law rights of publicity,""' 3
and just before a still different statutory claim based on California
14
Civil Code Section 3344, discussed below."
105.
106.
107.
108.

Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 462.
Id. at 461.

109. In fact, one of Bette Midler's lawyers recently requested a copy of the 100year-old essay from the author of this article.
110. Appellant's Opening Brief at i - ii. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d
460 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168).
111. Id. at 23.
112. Id. at 24.
113. Id. at ii.

114. See infra text accompanying notes 126-133.
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Midler's opening brief presented her property interests, which the
Ninth Circuit ultimately held provided a viable basis for a common
law cause of action, under a right of publicity theory." 5 Her reply
brief discussed both "Common Law Rights of Privacy and Publicity"
in a single section."16 The reply brief argued:
Midler respectfully submits that Defendants have simply not
shown a logical reason why a celebrity's distinctive voice
should be freely exploited for commercial purposes while other
aspects of the celebrity's persona are protected by common
law doctrines of commercial appropriation. Moreover, there
is no reason to exempt imitators who deceive the public 7 into
believing they are hearing a celebrity's distinctive voice. '
The Ninth Circuit seemed to respond to this argument, when the
court recognized a common law right to damages based on the claim
that "defendants here for their own profit in selling their product did
appropriate part of her identity.""' ' However, the court called the
right involved neither publicity nor privacy, but property.
The defendants' brief also argued this aspect of the case in terms
of privacy and publicity rights, rather than property. Their brief
asserted: "Plaintiff does not have a viable claim under . . . invasion
of privacy or invasion of the right of publicity."" 9 This section of
the defendants' brief began by pointing out that "[u]nder California
law, no real distinction is made between the interests protected by the
right of publicity and those protected by the appropriation branch of
the right of privacy.' ' 20 Noting that the "debate over whether the
right to control exploitation of one's name or likeness sounds in tort
or property is 'pointless,"' 2 the defendants' brief argued that neither
right was involved in the Midler case. Since "there is nothing in the
Sable commercial to suggest that plaintiff is in any way connected
with the commercial,"' 22 and "[d]efendants did not use plaintiff's
[actual] voice in the Sable commercial,"'' 2s the defendants asserted
115. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
116. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-6168) [hereinafter Appellant's Reply Brief].
117. Id. at 11-12.
118. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463-64.
119. Appellees' Brief, supra note 79, at i.
120. Id. at 21 (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603
P.2d 425, 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979)).
121. Id. at 21-22. The Ninth Circuit seems implicitly to have agreed.
122. Id. at 27.
123. Id. at 28.
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that there was no privacy or publicity theory of liability available to
Midler.'2
The Ninth Circuit did not adopt the arguments presented in any
of the briefs. Rather, the court described a different theory of liability,
which is in some ways similar to the proprietary aspect of the right
of privacy which Warren and Brandeis had described in connection
with the Marion Manola case. The Ninth Circuit opinion is remarkably
succinct. After describing the factual context, with emphasis on the
deliberateness of the defendants' conduct, the court placed its ruling
outside the purview of both first amendment protection and federal
copyright law: "A voice is not copyrightable. The sounds are not
'fixed.' What is put forward as protectible here is more personal than
any work of authorship.' 1 25 Moreover, the opinion makes clear that
the theory of liability which the court recognized was not based on
common law privacy rights, nor on statutory rights under California
Civil Code Section 3344,126 which provides for general damages when
a person has been injured by unconsented use of that individual's
"name, voice, signature, photograph or likeness in any manner."1 27
The Ninth Circuit's opinion did, however, refer to Civil Code
Section 3344 as implicit legislative recognition of common law property rights to an individual's identity in addition to those provided by
the statute. Since the final subsection of Section 3344 notes that,
"[tjhe remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall
be in addition to any others provided for by law,' '1 28 California law
must protect some additional common law rights not covered in the
statute. Among these common law rights were property rights similar
to those described in another statute, Civil Code Section 990.129 The
California legislature enacted Civil Code Section 990 after a California
Supreme Court decision that the rights under Section 3344 were
personal and could not pass to the heirs of deceased personalities. 30
This additional Civil Code section was designed to protect what the
statute explicitly describes as descendible "property rights" in the
124. Id. at 21-22.
125. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
126. Id.
127. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1990). For an explanation why Civil
Code § 3344 does not appear to include vocal likeness within the term "likeness,"
see Weinstein, Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness: Section 3344 and
the Common Law, 52 L.A. BAR J. 430, 438 (1977).
128. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West Supp. 1990).
129. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1990).
130. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 824, 603 P.2d 425, 431, 160
Cal. Rptr. 323, 329 (1979).

1990:4011

OTHER MISS M

identities of deceased personalities. 3 ' Reasoning by analogy to Section
990, the Ninth Circuit logically concluded that similar property rights
must exist for living people, like Bette Midler.3 2 The final subsection
of Section 3344 had explicitly left room for such common law property
of such
rights. Therefore, the opinion concluded, "[a]ppropriation
33
California."'
in
tort
a
is
rights
common law [property]
The key precedent for this ruling was a Ninth Circuit case decided
on the basis of California law as it existed before either Civil Code
Section 3344 or Civil Code Section 990 had been enacted. The case,
Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,'1 was extensively
briefed by both parties in the Midler appeal. In Motschenbacher, the
Ninth Circuit had recognized tort liability for interference with a
"proprietary interest' '1 35 injured by "an appropriation of the attributes of one's identity.' ' 36 Motschenbacher involved an altered photograph of a famous race car driver's car. The driver was in the car,
but not recognizable.' 37 Nevertheless, the Midler opinion described
Motschenbacher as having been "physically used" in the television
commercial. 31 Midler's identity was not used in such a physical way,
but, the court concluded, she was nevertheless subjected to a similar
"injury from 'an appropriation of the attributes of one's identity." 3 9
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the opinion is the way it
artfully evoked Midler's property right in her celebrated identity. The
court's explanation began by asking a series of rhetorical questions:
"Why did the defendants ask Midler to sing if her voice was not of
value to them? Why did they studiously acquire the services of a
sound-alike and instruct her to imitate Midler if Midler's voice was
not of value to them?"' 4 The court immediately answered its own
questions: "What they sought was an attribute of Midler's identity.
Its value was what the market would have paid for Midler to have
131. CAL. CIV. CODE § 990 (West Supp. 1990). This Section was enacted in
1984. 1984 Cal. Stats. ch. 1704 § 1. The same 1984 statute also made a number of
revisions to Civil Code § 3344. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1704 § 2.
132. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
133. Id.
134. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
135. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th
Cir. 1974).
136. Id. at 824.
137. Id. at 822.
138. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
139. Id. (citing Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821,
824 (9th Cir. 1974)).
140. Id.
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sung the commercial in person.' ' 4' Since Bette Midler's identity, as
embodied in the sound of her voice, was treated as having value by
the defendants, the court reasoned that the defendants should not be
allowed to deny her valuable property right in it. Moreover, the court
pointed out, the legislature of the State of California had recognized
just such a property right in identity when the legislature enacted
Civil Code Section 990.
To establish that the sound of Midler's singing voice constituted
an element of her identity,' 42 in the same way the appearance of
Motschenbacher's car was an element of his identity, the Ninth Circuit
relied on insights from a remarkable book of philosophy, Listening
and Voice: A Phenomenology of Sound by Don Ihde.' 43 The Midler
opinion briefly quoted from a section of the book which discussed
auditory fields and auras:
The experience of an auditory aura is "like" the experience
of music in which intentionality though keenly aware, "lets
be" the musical presence so that the sound rushes over and
through one. But it is not like music in that the temptation to
become disembodied, to allow oneself to float away beyond
the instrumentation is absent. Rather, in the face-to-face
speaking the other is there, embodied, while exceeding his
outline-body, but the other is in my focus as there before me
face to face. It is in his speaking that he fills the space between
us and by it I am auditorily immersed and penetrated as sound
"physically" invades my own body.'"
The insight that hearing the sound of a distinctive voice causes one
to identify and emotionally respond to the person whose voice is
141. Id.
142. The Midler opinion had earlier distinguished other decisions which had
denied liability for vocal imitation, for example, Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300
F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962). Lahr involved a television commercial for Lestoil which
used a Lahr-like voice for a cartoon figure of a duck. This vocal imitation was held
by the First Circuit not to be grounds for a cause of action in unfair competition.
Cf., Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971) (unfair competition claim involving use of the song,
"These Boots Are Made For Walkin.').

143. D.

IhDE, LISTENING AND VOICE:

A

PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOUND

(1976). It is

difficult to describe objectively the book's meaning because Ihde's method is more
evocative than analytic and argumentative. The book's author describes his own book
in the preface as "a prolegomena to an ontology of listening with suggestions for
the implications of a philosophy of sound." Id. at ix.
144. Id. at 79.
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heard, made the crucial connection between the sound of Midler's
145
voice and her property rights in her own identity.
Neither party cited the Ihde work in the briefs on appeal. Rather,
Midler's argument regarding the embodiment of her identity in the
sound of her voice relied on testimony, such as the declarations
quoted in her reply brief. For example, Ken Fritz, a personal manager
in the entertainment business, stated, "When I saw this commercial I
thought Bette Midler was doing the singing on the commercial. To
me, it sounded like Bette Midler."' Ula Hedwig, Midler's former
back-up singer who sang in the commercial, described her task of
Bette
imitating "Bette Midler's voice as closely as possible ....
Midler's singing voice is very distinctive, and I believe that I was able
to imitate her in the recording for the television commercial due to
' 47
the many years I have worked as a Harlette.'
Focusing on the deliberateness of the defendants' conduct in
seeking to acquire the value of the sound of Bette Midler's voice for
their television commercial, the Ninth Circuit seemed to hoist the
defendants on their own petards: "[W]hen a distinctive voice of a
professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in
order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs
and have committed a tort in California." 4 The court was convinced
that the defendants got just what they wanted. Since they took what
they wanted, despite Midler's refusal to sell it and without paying for
it, the defendants committed a tort. They lifted the value of her
identity, almost as if they had stolen her purse. Such a theory of
liability for purloining a famous person's identity is reminiscent of
the explanation Warren and Brandeis gave for the legal vindication
Marion Manola secured.

IV.

BETWEEN THE Two Miss Ms

Almost a hundred years separate the stories of the two Miss Ms.
There are also numerous differences between the legal rights discussed
by Warren and Brandeis in connection with Marion Manola and those
145. A computer search by the author of both major computer-assisted legal
research systems uncovers no other citation to the Ihde work. One wonders slightly
about the esoteric field of phenomenology working its way into the legal analysis in
the opinion.
146. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 116, at 7. The Ninth Circuit refers to
this declaration in its opinion. Midler 849 F.2d at 462.
147. Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 116, at 7. The Ninth Circuit's opinion
also alludes to this declaration in its opinion. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
148. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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recognized by the Ninth Circuit in approving Bette Midler's cause of
action. Three of these differences in legal doctrine are particularly
interesting: the nature of the rationale, the structure of the legal
doctrine and the type of remedy.
In the first place, unlike the Midler decision's detailed rationale,
the legal doctrine behind Marion Manola's case was not provided by
the court which ruled in Marion Manola's favor. The explanation was
supplied by Warren and Brandeis. As noted earlier, there is no
published judicial opinion in Marion Manola's case. The New York
court simply granted, ex parte, the injunctive relief the comic opera
prima donna had requested. So far as anyone knows, the court gave
no reasons for ruling in her favor. Warren and Brandeis were the
ones who suggested a rationale for this ruling when they discussed
the case in their law review article. They explained the court's grant
of an injunction against the use of photographs taken without Manola's consent as designed to protect her proprietary right not to have
her picture used without her consent. They presented this right as
part of the right to an "inviolate personality," 49 which involved
psychological and emotional interests as well. 3 0 In contrast, the Ninth
Circuit's published opinion provides the court's own logical rationale,
discussed above, for recognizing Bette Midler's right to recover the
fair market value of the use of the sound of her voice.
A second difference between the legal rights asserted by the two
Miss Ms is structural. The Ninth Circuit's discussion of Midler's
property right in her identity is unconnected with other types of rights
or injuries. Unlike the Warren and Brandeis essay which interrelates
proprietary with emotional rights, the opinion in Midler rests the
court's decision on a free-standing property right unconnected to any
overarching right to privacy, or principle of "inviolate personality,"
which might also protect against injuries to Midler's feelings. The
Ninth Circuit's rationale is really not directly concerned with Bette
Midler's feelings at all. This separation of property rights in a person's
identity from privacy rights against emotional injuries is structurally
quite different from Warren and Brandeis' approach which connects
these rights under the broader rubric of a right to privacy.
This separation of property rights in identity is a distinctive
feature of California law regarding publicity/privacy rights. The
reasons for the split between privacy and property rights in California
law are partly historical. The tort right of privacy came into California
149. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, 205.
150. Id. at 206.
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law in 1931, in the court of appeal's decision in Melvin v. Reid.'5 '
Melvin involved the motion picture, "The Red Kimono," which used
the name and life story of a reformed prostitute who had been
acquitted of murder seven years earlier. Relying on article I, section
1 of the California constitution, which at that time guaranteed "certain inalienable rights, among which are those of ... pursuing and
obtaining ... happiness,"1 2 the court approved Mrs. Melvin's right
of privacy cause of action. In this cause of action, Mrs. Melvin
complained of "grievous mental and physical suffering to her damage
in the sum of fifty thousand dollars."'5 3 Holding that such a privacy
right was "an incident of the person and not of property,"'15 4 the
court of appeal expressly rejected all three of Mrs. Melvin's other
causes of action based on property claims to her name and life
"'
story. 55
Thus, this first recognition of a cause of action under
California law for invasion of privacy specifically rejected proprietary
aspects of privacy such as those Warren and Brandeis had discussed
in connection with Marion Manola's case.
I However, rejection of property rights in a person's identity in
Melvin v. Reid does not mean that the property right recognized in
Midler is in any sense illegitimate. California law changed a great
deal during the fifty years between Melvin and Midler. A 1955 court
of appeal decision recognized a common law cause of action for use
of an attorney's name in an advertisement for photocopiers,5 6 although the court held that the actionable injury was to the lawyer's
subjective feelings, mental peace and happiness. Enactment of Civil
Code Section 3344 in 1971 established a statutory cause of action for
intentional commercial use of a person's name or likeness and provided minimum damages of $300.'"7 In 1984, further legislation
151. 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
152. See Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 291, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931) (citing
152 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1). A 1974 initiative expressly added "privacy" to these
state constitutional guarantees. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (new section adopted Nov. 5,
1974).
153. Melvin, 112 Cal. App. at 287, 297 P. at 91.

154. Id. at 290, 297 P. at 93. The court of appeal repeatedly insisted that she
had no property rights in her name and the incidents of her life.
155. 112 Cal. App. at 292, 297 P. at 94.
156. Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equipment Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82,
291 P.2d 194 (1955).
157. 1971 Cal. Stat. ch. 1595 § 1. See Comment, Commercial Appropriation Of
An Individual's Name, Photograph or Likeness: A New Remedy For Californians, 3
PAC. L.J. 651 (1972), which sketches the legislative history of the enactment of Civil
Code § 3344; see also, Weinstein, supra note 112. In 1984, Civil Code § 3344 was
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amended Section 3344 and adopted a new section, Civil Code Section
990. Civil Code Section 990 characterized the rights it protected as
"property rights," so that they would continue to exist as a basis for
legal action after the death of the individual whose identity was
protected under the statute. These property rights were similar to
those discussed by Warren and Brandeis in connection with Marion
Manola's case.
California's statutory property rights, and the parallel common
law right recognized in Midler, are, however, conceptually quite
different from Warren's and Brandeis' notion of proprietary privacy
rights integrally related to a larger legal principle. It was this larger
principle, called the right to privacy, which was Warren's and Brandeis' main concern in their article. In contrast, the property rights in
personal identity recognized in Midler, and in Civil Code Section 990,
exist independently of any such general right to privacy. Since no
overarching privacy principle explicitly intertwines both proprietary
and emotional aspects of the right to privacy in California decisional
law and legislation, none is discussed in the Midler opinion.
A third difference between the legal rights asserted by the two
Miss MI relates to the nature of the remedy. Consonant with the
Ninth Circuit's recognition of a free-standing property right in Bette
Midler's identity, the remedy suggested in Midler is restitutionary.
This remedy was designed to restore to Midler the value of what the
advertisers had taken from her, as well as to extract from them the
unjust enrichment they received from using her identity. Such a
damage remedy is very different from the injunctive remedy Marion
Manola sought and secured. Marion Manola did not seek payment
for the use of her picture to advertise the comic opera in which she
was appearing. She sought and secured control over the use of her
image. The injury Marion Manola sought to prevent was not pecuniary
but rather an injury to her feelings-her outrage at the way she had
been treated and her desire to preserve her image in the eyes of her
daughter.
In contrast, the remedial aspects of the Midler opinion are not
concerned with vindicating injuries to Bette Midler's feelings, her
emotional well-being or her sense of self-control. The Ninth Circuit's
amended to provide for minimum damages of $750 as well as punitive damages and

attorney's fees. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 1704 § 2. The 1984 amendments also provided a
method for calculating actual damages which included "profits from the unauthorized
use that are attributable to the use." CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1990).
A similar damages provision was included in Civil Code §990(a). 1984 Cal. Stats. ch.

1704 §§1.
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theory of liability is solely concerned with restoring to Bette Midler
what an advertising agency would have had to have paid to persuade
her to sing background for its automobile commercial. The remedy
therefore simply required payment for what had been taken. The jury
instructions in the trial which followed the Ninth Circuit's decision
described this remedial doctrine as follows:
When the distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely
known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product,
the singer's rights have been violated. In such a case, the
singer is entitled to the fair market value of what was taken.
Thus, the only questions you must decide are:
(1) Whether Young & Rubicam deliberately imitated Bette
Midler's voice in producing Ford Motor Co.'s Sable automobile television commercial.
If the answer to the first question is "Yes," then,
(2) [you must decide] the fair market value of Bette Midler's
voice.
Most of you are familiar with the term "copyright." Copyright law protects authors of original works, such as the song
Do You Want To Dance?. There are no issues of copyright
law, as such, for you to decide in this case. However, in
deciding whether or not Young & Rubicam deliberately imitated Bette Midler's voice, you must keep in mind that Y&R
had the right to use the song. You must also keep in mind
that the mere imitation of a performance contained in a
recording is not a violation of the copyright law. Thus, the
issue is whether or not Bette Midler's voice was deliberately
imitated.'
The evidence presented to the jury with regard to the fair market
value of Bette Midler's voice covered a wide range from about $45,000
to over $1 million. In the end, it appears that the jury compromised
With a verdict of $400,000 in compensatory damages for the television
commercial's use of a deliberate imitation of Midler's voice recorded
on her hit record. The jury verdict seems somewhat quixotic, since it
is supposed to represent what the advertising agency would have had
to pay Bette Midler to sing background music for the automobile
commercial, despite the fact that she had refused to sing for this or
any other commercial.15 9
158. Callagy, BETTE, WHOSE SONG IS rr ANYWAY?, ADWEEK, Nov. 13, 1989, at
33-35.
159. "Its value was what the market would have paid for Midler to have sung
the commercial in person." Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
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* Bette Midler's second appeal, which seeks reversal of the trial
court's decision not to allow her punitive damage claim to go to the
jury, seems to indicate that the restitutionary remedy outlined in the
Ninth Circuit's opinion did not fully respond to her outrage at the
way defendants had treated her. Restoration of the fair market value
of her property rights in her vocal identity, as used in the television
commercial, seemed to have been only part of what Midler had in
mind when she brought suit. Just as Marion Manola before her, Bette
Midler appeared to have desired something more than just to be paid
fair market value for the property rights to the distinctive sound of
her voice. Bette Midler, like Marion Manola almost a century earlier,
had not wanted to sell herself in such a way, in the first place.
V.

PROPERTY AND PRIVACY

A person's identity is not, of course, exactly like other forms of
property. The value of a famous identity depends on legal enforcement
of control over the uses of the identity. In discussing proprietary
aspects of the right to privacy, the late Edward Bloustein remarked:
[C]reation of ... advertising value is not founded on competition among bidders for a scarce resource; rather, it is
founded on the law which artificially creates a scarcity by
giving the individual a property right it its use.... A name
and likeness can only command a commercial price in a society
that permits a person to control the conditions under which
he may use his name and likeness for commercial purposes.w
Explaining why the law should give such a person as Marion Manola
control over the commercial use of her identity was Warren and
Brandeis' main concern. They suggested a theoretical explanation in
terms of a general right to privacy. Warren and Brandeis presented
this theory as a new structure of legal doctrine which justified both
protecting the property rights asserted by Marion Manola and vindicating related emotional rights as well. Accordingly, Warren and
Brandeis advocated legal recognition of the "principle of inviolate
personality,"' 16' which encompassed more than one legal right: both
property rights to control the commercial uses of an individual's
personality and tort rights to damages for injuries to an individual's
feelings. They described Marion Manola's right to control photo160. Bloustein, Privacy Is Dear at Any Price: A Response to ProfessorPosner's
Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REv. 429, 448-49 (1978).
161. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 205.
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graphic images of her as an intriguing example of the first of these
subcategories. They presented it as a reasonably conventional intangible property right related via the principle of inviolate personality
to the much more controversial rights to legal protection for an
individual's feelings. The latter, more controversial subcategory, involving emotional rights, became the main focus of their argument.
In discussing proprietary privacy rights, such as those asserted by
Marion Manola, Warren and Brandeis reflected a handful of contemporary court decisions regarding the use of photographs, such as
Pollardv. PhotographicCo. 62 and domestic portraits, such as Prince
Albert v. Strange.163 To these reported cases, Warren and Brandeis
added Marion Manola's unreported case as a dramatic illustration of
how enforcement of the right to privacy already tacitly operated to
restore control over an individual's image and identity to that individual. In these cases, the monetary value of the image was not what
was really at issue. Rather, the real concern was about returning
control over a person's image to the individual portrayed. There was
also an element of concern about vindication against the offensiveness
of having an unwilling person's personality used for commercial
purposes.
The first reported decision which discussed Warren and Brandeis'
novel idea of a privacy principle connecting property rights with rights
against emotional injuries, was the decision by the New York Supreme
Court, Special Term, in Schuyler v. Curtis." The same court which
granted Marion Manola her injunction also issued and continued the
injunction discussed in Schuyler. Schuyler involved a plan by the
Woman's Memorial Association to place a life-size statue of a deceased philanthropist, Mrs. George Schuyler, next to a statue of Susan
B. Anthony at the 1893 Columbian Exposition in Chicago. Mrs.
Schuyler's heirs objected to the very thought of the image of the late
New York society matron appearing next to that of Ms. Anthony,
whom the court described as a "well-known agitator.' ' 6 5 The heirs
succeeded in enjoining this use of the late Mrs. Schuyler's image.
Presenting the case as not directly concerned with property rights in
Mrs. Schuyler's image, Judge O'Brien described it as involving the
issuance of an injunction in circumstances where damages would not
have been recoverable in an action at law. Quoting from the decision
162. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
163. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 (1849).
164. 15 N.Y.S. 787 (Sup. Ct. 1891). This decision was ultimately overturned by
the NewYork Court of Appeals. 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (1895).
165. Schuyler, 15 N.Y.S. at 787.
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in Pollard, the Schuyler opinion noted that "the right to grant an
injunction does not depend in any way on the existence of property." " After determining that Mrs. Schuyler was not a public
character who had waived her right to privacy, the court rested its
that the right to which protection is given
decision on "the principle
67
is the right to privacy.'
The specific question in Schuyler was whether an injunction could
be issued "to prevent what ... [the courts] considered and treated as
a wrong,"'" without any basis in a property claim. This issue regarding the proper grounds for an injunction, specifically whether an
injunction could be granted when there had been no showing of
damages to property, was rather hotly contested at the time. Warren
and Brandeis seemed to be aware of the controversy over the proper
basis for issuing injunctions but not interested in discussing it at
length. They simply noted that among the "remedies for an invasion
of the right of privacy" should be "[a]n injunction, in perhaps a very
limited class of cases."' 169

The major scholarly response to Warren and Brandeis came from
Herbert Spencer Hadley in 1894.170 Hadley was particularly concerned

about the proper basis for an injunction. Hadley was also quite
candid: "The writer believes that the right to privacy does not

exist.'

' 71

Hadley's article is noteworthy for present purposes, because

he insisted that in cases where there was no property right, there
could be no legal right. He claimed that Warren and Brandeis had

argued that property rights in intellectual property, including photographs, were "a mere fiction."' 72 Hadley was unable even to see,

much less to accept, the central premise of the Warren and Brandeis

article: that the law should recognize a general right to privacy which

166. 15 N.Y.S. at 787-88 (citing Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. Div. 345
(1888)).
167. 15 N.Y.S. at 789. Judge O'Brien later defended his ruling in Schuyler in a
law review article. See, O'Brien, The Right of Privacy, 2 Colum. L. Rev. 437 (1902).

168. 15 N.Y.S. at 788.

169. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 219.
170. Hadley, The Right to Privacy, 3 Nw. L. Rev. 1 (1894).

171. Id. at 3.

172. Id. at 1. Hadley portrayed Warren and Brandeis as arguing that "the real
basis of the jurisdiction" for granting injunctions against unconsented use of pho-

tographs "consisted in the protection of 'personal feelings,' the protection of the
'sanctity of private life,' and a general attention to that important trait of character
and culture . . . -amenity." Id. at 1-2. Later in his article, Hadley raised the concern
that injunctions enforcing the right to privacy might interfere with freedom of

expression. Id. at 17-18.
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justified and explained why property rights in intellectual property
deserve legal protection.
Hadley complained:
If the law should become established in pursuance with these
[Warren and Brandeis'] suggestions, it is submitted that the
"right" would be found to be so completely pruned away that

the shadow remaining would hardly furnish sufficient substance to interest the ordinary man or woman in this busy
173
world of ours.

For Hadley, and others of his day, the right to privacy was a shadow
without substance, because it was not based in property. Hadley could
not quite make out its shape and outline and was not persuaded of
the existence of what he could not see. In the 1890s the received
structure of legal doctrine, as Hadley and others saw it, did not
include Warren and Brandeis' concept of a right to privacy. For
Hadley, there was no general legal principle which explained such
cases as Marion Manola's. Hadley was in a sense stuck at the level
of looking only at conventional property rights. He could not imagine
a broader, more general right to privacy which might embrace the
right to property, particularly intangible intellectual property. The
right to privacy for which Warren and Brandeis argued was, of
course, a different structure of legal doctrine, a new paradigm, or
way of looking at common law rights, including property rights. 74
Unable to envision and unwilling to accept this new structure of legal
doctrine, Hadley rejected the right to privacy as, quite simply, wrong.
Hadley's inability to imagine a structure of legal rights in which
the right to privacy included, but was not limited to, property rights
in a person's identity, found echoes in some of the early court
decisions which considered the right to privacy. The most notable of
these early decisions was Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,' 7
the first high court decision regarding a claim explicitly based on the
right to privacy. The Roberson decision rejected the right to privacy.
Expressly disapproving the injunction in Schuyler, 176 discussed above,
the Roberson decision also implicitly rejected the unreported lower
court decision in Marion Manola's case. 177
173. Id. at 3.
174. Cf., T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScImNTmc
175. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).

REVOLUTIONS

(1970).

176. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 551, 64 N.E. 442,

445. (Citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. Ct. Ap. 1895)).
177. The Roberson majority opinion does not discuss Manola, but it does discuss
Schuyler.
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Although the Roberson majority discussed the Warren and Brandeis law review article, there are unmistakable signs that the author
of the majority opinion, Chief Judge Parker, may not have read the
actual article. 17 The majority opinion even got the title wrong. The
title he cited was "Rights of a Citizen to His Reputation," a slightly
garbled version of the title of an article by the newspaper editor, E.L.
Godkin, published in Scribner's Magazine in July 1890.'79 However,
Chief Judge Parker did appear to have read, and to have taken to
heart, Hadley's article which had insisted that the law does not and
should not recognize a right to privacy, only property rights. The
Roberson majority found no property rights on the part of Miss
Roberson in the photographs made of her. The damages she claimed
were only for injuries to her feelings from the use of her picture in
advertising flour. Without a property right, the majority held, she
had no legal ground either for an injunction or for damages.8
Judge Gray, who apparently had read and understood the Warren
and Brandeis article, dissented. His dissent argued that Miss Roberson's right to privacy should have been protected as an aspect of her
property rights, albeit of an unconventional, non-monetary sort. Even
assuming that "tihe right to grant the injunction ...

depends upon

the existence of property in any right which belongs to a person,"''
Judge Gray argued that Miss Roberson should have been granted an
injunction against the use of the photographs. His dissenting opinion
asserted that, "the issuance of the injunction does not, in such a case
[as Miss, Roberson's], depend upon the amount of the damages in
dollars and cents.' ' 82 In Judge Gray's view, Miss Roberson's privacy
rights should have been protected as an aspect of her property rights
in her own image and identity just as they had been, according to
Warren and Brandeis, in Marion Manola's case. Judge Gray urged
recognition of a connection between Miss Roberson's privacy rights
and her property rights in her identity. This connection between
privacy and property was palpable to Judge Gray because he consid178. There is a frequently repeated remark that the Warren and Brandeis article
is more often cited than read. Cf., MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 1-8, citing Barron,

Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy: Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13
U.L. REv. 875, 877 (1979).
179. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen to his Own Reputation, 8 SCRIDNER'S

SUFFOLK

July 1890 at 58. Warren and Brandeis cited Godkin's article as an example
of discussion of "the evil of the invasion of privacy by the newspapers." Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
180. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 556-57, 64 N.E. at 447-48.
181. Roberson, 171 N.Y. at 565, 64 N.E. at 451 (Gray, J., dissenting).
182. Id at 566, 64 N.E. at 451 (Gray, J., dissenting).
MAGAZINE,
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ered these property rights from the point of view of the new structure
of legal doctrine, or paradigm, which Warren and Brandeis had
suggested in their article. Unlike the majority, Judge Gray seems to
have remembered what Marion Manola's case signified.
In Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 183 the Georgia Supreme
Court agreed with Judge Gray's dissenting perspective. Moreover, the
Georgia court did more than just remember Marion Manola's case;
the court's opinion discussed it at some length.11 Approving a theory

of liability which allowed recovery of damages for injury to feelings,
Justice Cobb's opinion argued that Mr. Pavesich, an artist, owned
himself and his identity, just as surely as any property could be
owned. Justice Cobb repeatedly expressed wonder that others had
been unable to see the privacy principle which encompassed both
property and emotional rights:
The form and features of the plaintiff are his own. The
defendant insurance company and its agent had no more
authority to display them in public for the purpose of advertising the business in which they were engaged than they would
have had to compel the plaintiff to place himself upon exhibition for this purpose. The latter procedure would have been
unauthorized and unjustifiable, as every one will admit, and
the former was equally an invasion of the rights of his
person.' 85
Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Cobb even "venture[d] to
predict that the day will come that the American bar will marvel that
a contrary view was ever entertained by judges of eminence and ability
...."186 The latter reference was to the judges who had joined the

majority in Roberson in rejecting the right to privacy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Modern decisions, such as that of the Ninth Circuit in Midler,
now routinely recognize property rights in a person's identity as an
established aspect of American law. Courts in these property-inidentity cases typically do not discuss Warren and Brandeis and often
183.
184.
185.
186.

122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68, 74 (1905).
Id. at 217, 50 S.E. at 79.
Id. at 220, 50 S.E. at 81.
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do not even mention the right to privacy.1 7 Often courts discussing

these property rights in a person's identity treat them as a separate

category, often called right of publicity,'88 distinct from rights to

damages for injuries to feelings, such as the privacy rights protected
in Pavesich. This approach began with Judge Frank's decision for the
Second Circuit in Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum. 89
Since the United States Supreme Court's approval of Ohio's right of
publicity cause of action in Zacchini v. Scripps-HowardBroadcasting
Company,190 courts have increasingly described these property rights
in identity as rights of publicity, rather than rights to privacy.' 9'
And yet, standing behind these property rights and publicity
rights decisions is an implicit theoretical background which helps to
explain and to justify why, in the face of other important societal
interests, such as freedom of expression and the objectives served by

copyright law, the law ought to recognize and protect this particular
form of property.

92

In modern cases, like Bette Midler's, such theo-

retical considerations often remain in the background. Sometimes,

however, it is worthwhile to reflect on these larger theories and to
read again Warren and Brandeis' famous article which first explored

these ideas. There are many reasons why one enjoys retelling the
stories of Marion Manola and Bette Midler. In seeking to understand
what has happened to the proprietary aspects of the right to privacy,

it is particularly interesting and enlightening to consider together the
rights asserted by the two divine Miss Ms.

187. See, e.g., Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d
Cir. 1953); O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941); State ex rel.
Elvis Presley International Memorial Foundation v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987).
188. For a thorough discussion of these cases and the right of publicity in

general, see Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the
Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199 (1986).

189. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
190. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
191. See Halpern, supra note 168, and J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at ch. 3;
see also Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
192. In considering the underlying reasons for protecting property rights, legal
philosophers have suggested a reciprocal relationship between protection of property
rights and the human personalities which hold them. See, e.g., Radin, Property and
Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957. (1982). The privacy-related property rights in
personality vindicated by Marion Manola and Bette Midler are interesting examples
of property rights accorded legal protection in part because of the intrinsic value of
the persons who hold the rights.

